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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the triumph march of mobile phones that currently are annexing music players, 
navigation devices, and cameras as separate physical objects. The next target is set on payment. 
Through synthesizing available literature, we construct a framework for studying digital payment 
platforms that combines platform, technology and business design aspects. The framework is applied 
to conduct a comparative case study of digital payment platforms. Four types of market actors are 
considered: banks, mobile network operators, merchants, and startups, which are incumbents and 
disrupters in the payment industry. These actors issue four types of payment systems, and we can 
observe that three of four platforms types can be classified as multi-sided platforms (MSP). All 
alternatives seek foothold by issuing evolutionary payment instruments, which are intertwined with 
digital payment platforms. By hosting third-party services, payment instruments are evolving from 
single-purpose to multi-functional ones. Our research extends existing payment literature from the 
MSP perspective to emphasize certain digital payment platform components, which impact strategies 
and complementary products.   
Keywords: Payment, payment card, mobile phone, multi-sided platforms, Near Field Communication 
(NFC), contactless payment, SMS, QR Code, mobile payment, payment infrastructure, payment 
systems 
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1 Introduction 
The mobile phone is a radical innovation and it demolishes well-established industries and business 
models, while gradually eroding their hard-earned concessions. As testimony, consider some 
examples: the mobile phone has or is in the midst of subsuming music players, navigation devices, and 
cameras as separate physical objects, with its corresponding industry and actors. The mobile phones´ 
triumphant march keeps propelling forward, and it is already on its way to conquering the next 
industry, namely payment. Currently, the payment arena is well established with predefined and well-
rehearsed roles and profitable business models. However, we suspect that the mobile phone is going to 
upset the harmony and equilibrium that currently characterizes the payment industry.  
New payment disrupters, most of them novices in the payment landscape (e.g. Google Wallet, 
Dwolla), are in attempt to change the status quo of payment. By issuing new digital payment 
instruments, payment disrupters have the deliberate goal to challenge payment incumbents. But before 
a new payment instrument can be adopted, market players such as banks, acquirers, payment solution 
providers, mobile network operators (MNO); as well as merchants and cardholders need to be 
convinced. That these market actors also follow their own payment agenda (e.g. MNOs) adds 
uncertainty, resulting in delayed adoption and a “cold war” of pre-emptive moves to secure a potential 
future market position.  
As the mobile phone is gaining a foothold in the payment industry, how do payment disrupters, 
strategically design and manage their digital payment service, in order to be adopted on the payer and 
payee side? First, since payment is the process of transferring money from payer to payee that 
involves physical payment instruments (Kokkola, 2010), how do payment disrupters design 
(technology-wise) their physical payment instruments. Second, as these payment instruments are 
digital proxies of payment platforms, equipped with Application Program Interfaces (APIs), how is 
platform access and maintenance regulated? Lastly, considering that payment fees is becoming less 
profitable in the near future (European Commission, 2013), how do payment disrupters tap new 
revenue sources. Thus, our research question is: 
How are payment incumbents and disrupters designing the next-generation payment platform, and 
what design and business strategies can they employ? 
To answer the research questions, we re-conceptualize new digital payment instruments as multi-sided 
platforms (MSP). We then derive a framework for multi-sided digital payment platforms that 
encompasses four components affecting providers’ choice of digital payment platform design 
strategies. After a comparative case study, our initial findings indicate that payment platforms 
probably will transform from two-sided (cardholder & merchant) into multi-sided (digital) payment 
platforms, where the interplay of platform design, technology design, and business design are decisive 
elements, to create positive network effects among platform users. As this paper has a platform centric 
and design approach, we chose to exclude end users from our analysis. 
Contribution and Overview 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we have conceptualized a framework, which we 
believe to enrich existing payment literature with a multi-sided platform theory perspective. This 
research is distilled from existing literature, by embracing a granular view on digital payment 
platforms. Second, by crafting a framework, we provide a theoretical lens to understand what digital 
payment platforms are, highlighting them as layered platforms. And lastly, as these platforms come in 
different design configurations, we offer insights on how a payment provider can strategically design 
and maneuver through these different platform layers, to fulfill their role as a payment provider. 
 
The paper proceeds in the following manner: To develop the framework, in the next section we 
characterize payment and review the payment literature. In Section 3 we present our research 
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framework by synthesizing factors that have been identified as critical in the launch of multi-sided 
platforms. In Section 4 we present our research method. In Section 5 we analyze four different 
payment systems planned or launched by four different types of actors in the European market. We 
synthesize our findings in Section 6 and finally, in Section 7, we draw some conclusions, discuss our 
limitations, and propose promising areas for further research. 
 
2 Payment as Multi-sided Platforms 
Payment is defined as a process of transferring money from payer to payee that involves payment 
instruments, payment processing and payment settlement (Kokkola, 2010). For the purpose of this 
paper we define money as fiat money, issued by governments, that is by law enforced to be accepted 
as legal tender (Rollins, 2003). In the mobile payment context, mobile payment is a payment 
instrument based on mobile devices (e.g., tablet computers or mobile phones) that makes use of 
wireless and communication technologies (Dahlberg, Mallat, Ondrus, & Zmijewska, 2008). To 
illustrate a card or mobile payment at the merchants’ checkout counter, Figure 1 visualizes different 
stages of payment processing and settlement among various payment actors.  
 
 
Figure 1: Payment Cycle 
2.1 Payment Systems Research 
Payment systems have not received extensive attention as a research topic over the past decade given 
the relative stability and well-defined roles that exist in the industry, but recently they have attracted 
growing attention. Scholars have studied payment systems and their corresponding payment cards as 
so-called two-sided platforms (or, in general, multi-sided markets) that need to attract both merchants 
and cardholders to be viable. Almost all papers point to network externalities (Rochet & Tirole, 2002); 
multi-homing costs, i.e., the burden of carrying several payment cards (Chakravorti & Roson, 2006); 
and acknowledging the importance of getting both sides on board – where one side is mostly 
subsidized while the other pays the revenue – to create a successful payment ecosystem (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2005b). The earliest payment network literature by Baxter (1983) considered payment 
systems as four-party systems, consisting of cardholders and merchants with their corresponding 
financial institutions: the banks and the acquirers. Baxter did not explicitly examine payment systems 
as multi-sided platforms, but his analysis about interchange fees and showcasing the interdependencies 
among market actors lay the foundation for a series of research papers, beginning in 2002, that all 
consider payment systems to be two-sided markets. 
 
Rochet & Tirole (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2006) examined, in a series of research papers, payment cards 
as two-sided platforms or markets, where payment cards need to attract both merchants and 
cardholders to create membership and usage externalities. Wright (2004) describes two-sided 
platforms that are able to link two distinct types of groups, which obtain value from interacting with 
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users from the other site on a common platform. Referring to payment cards schemes, he outlines that 
these platforms cater to cardholders and merchants, and that the conventional logic of one-sided 
markets is not a suitable approach to describe the payment card industry.  
Chakravorti and Roson (2006) noted that cardholders and merchants have preferences for certain 
payment cards and brands, where multi-homing, i.e., carrying or accepting several payment cards, is a 
common phenomenon, which leads to payment network competition. Rysman (2009) considers 
payment cards as two-sided, whereas store cards and gas cards are inherently one-sided payment 
cards, due to the fact that they can only be used at the issuing company. Evans and Schmalensee 
(2005a) analyzed the pricing structures and antitrust issues of unitary or three-party payment systems 
(closed systems) such as AmEx, Diners Club and Discover Card, where card issuer and acquirer are 
the same, making interchange fees obsolete in this setting. On the other hand, multi-party payment 
systems or four-party payment schemes (open systems) such as Visa and MasterCard, allow third 
parties to join their payment networks, by fulfilling the requirements of card issuers or acquirers. 
Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006, p. 347) have briefly sketched a “software platform-based 
ecosystem for payment cards” as a multi-sided payment platform, discussing therein the historical 
failure of smart cards, which were able to host applications. However, Evans et al. (2006) did not 
sufficiently elaborate on how these new application payment platforms with their physical proxies are 
specifically designed to create network effects. 
Overall, these papers do not attribute sufficient attention to recent technology design developments in 
the payment landscape, particularly, how payment instruments are transforming from a single-purpose 
(payment card) to a multi-functional ones (mobile phone). Digital payment platforms are becoming 
advanced IT systems, which can offer APIs to third parties. As a consequence, many digital payment 
platforms are evolving from being initially two-sided into multi-sided platforms. To illustrate the 
development, new payment service providers, e.g. Google Wallet, make use of Near Field 
Communication (NFC) and cloud computing technologies. In doing so, digital wallets can store 
several different cards at once (loyalty, credit and debit cards) in one device.  
Considering the aforementioned aspects, current and prospective payment providers have to consider 
several strategic implications: First, the technology of payment instruments (e.g. NFC) has an impact 
on how payment works in practice. Second, as we perceive payment as digital platforms, which offer 
APIs, payment providers have to decide about platform design aspects, i.e. the degree of platform co-
creation and the access by third parties. Third, as payment fees gradually diminish, payment providers 
have to explore new revenue generators or markets, as payment becomes a by-product.  
To make sense of these new phenomena in the payment landscape, the following theoretical tool, 
“Digital Payment Platform Design,” is conceptualized to assess and provide an understanding how 
payment disrupters design their digital payment platforms.  
 
3 Digital Payment Platform Design 
In this section, we present our Digital Payment Platform Design framework, which is a synthesis of 
related works and existing literature we have identified as being essential to creating viable digital 
(mobile) payment platforms. 
Traditionally, value creation has been achieved through a number of incremental steps from raw 
material to products and services (Porter, 1985; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). This worked well for 
industrial products, but recently, ecosystems that create value by facilitating interactions among 
different groups have created an interest as an analytical lens for understanding value creation. 
We adopt the notion by Hagiu and Wright (2011) and define a MSP as “an organization that creates 
value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated 
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customers.” MSPs are either digital, such as search engines, or physical, like shopping malls that are 
attracting at least two distinct groups, both of which have the demand to interact with each other. 
Search engines, for instance, join searchers and advertisers; meanwhile, shopping malls are connecting 
shoppers and merchants (Hagiu & Wright, 2011). The platform itself thereby acts as an intermediary, 
which can be operated either by one or more entities, called “platform providers.” The primary task of 
a platform is to coordinate and facilitate the direct interactions in a controlled manner, thereby 
providing the architecture and a set of rules for each participant. In general, the value of a MSP is 
highly dependent on the number of users on both sides (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006). To 
describe the logic of new digital payment platforms, we adapted the framework by Hagiu and Wright 
(2011) that demonstrates the general idea of a MSP, which we have extended to represent a digital 
payment platform (Figure 2).  
As this paper is focusing solely on digital payment platforms, in the remainder of this paper we 
therefore limit ourselves by excluding the merchant (payee) and the cardholder (payer), which are both 
subject to network effects, switching and homing costs (Kazan & Damsgaard, 2013), but will not be 
part of this analysis. We realize that a payment platform is sine qua none without the merchants and 
cardholder, however, we focus on the design aspects of the payment platform itself to provide a more 
in-depth analysis of this aspect. 
 
 
Component Description 
Direct Interaction Classifies a platform as being a Multi-Sided Platform. 
Platform Design Describes open and closed systems, and how complementary products are 
distributed. 
Technology Design The applied technology based on evolutionary or revolutionary hardware 
strategies. 
Business Design Market-entry strategies through bundling products and leveraging an installed 
user base (envelopment attack). Alternatively, through Schumpeterian innovation, 
which is more radical, but rare to achieve. 
Figure 2. Digital Payment Platform Design Framework 
 
 
3.1 Direct Interaction 
Direct interaction is the key criterion to classifying a platform as truly multi-sided. For instance, the 
music and movie store iTunes by Apple connects content providers with buyers. However, if we read 
the terms of use, it is actually a direct commercial purchase contract with Apple and not with the 
studios; therefore, iTunes is acting solely as a re-seller platform and not as a MSP. Contrary to the 
iTunes store, according to the terms of use, the Apple App Store is indeed a genuine MSP, which 
enables a direct commercial interaction between software developers and buyers. In consequence, to 
classify a (payment) platform as being multi-sided or not, the contract design that specifies the direct 
commercial relationships among third parties is an important aspect for the classification (Hagiu et al., 
2011). 
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3.2 Platform Design: Four different platform design strategies 
To make sense of different platform strategies and how complementary products are distributed, we 
adapted the framework by Iyer and Henderson (2010) (Figure 3), which is a suitable theoretical lens to 
analyze the logic of different types of (payment) platform design strategies, determined by the level of 
platform co-creation (development dimension) and the distribution of complementary applications 
(usage dimension). 
Development Dimension. MSPs can be characterized as being closed or open systems that determine 
the degree of involvement of third parties. Closed systems exclude third parties from any platform 
modification, where Apple serves as a good example. The iOS by Apple is a closed mobile operating 
system, allowing – with its walled garden approach – control over every aspect on the mobile device, 
thereby excluding any third parties from platform development. On the contrary, Google’s Android 
mobile operating system is open source (i.e., the Android Open Source Project), allowing third parties 
significant modifications.  
Usage Dimension. Platforms also differentiate as to how complementary applications are affiliated. 
Software developers for Windows, for instance, don’t need the permission of Microsoft to build 
Windows software (free approach). Platforms accompanied by rules, where complementary software 
is affiliated in a controlled manner, represent the moderated approach. The app development for iOS 
requires Apple’s permission to be affiliated and distributed through the platform.  
  
Figure 3.  Development and Usage of IT Platforms 
Through these two dimensions, we can derive four platform strategies: 
1. The open and free approach allows third parties to alter and adapt the system to their needs, 
allowing them to distribute services without permission from the platform provider.  
2. The closed and moderated approach is the opposite of the latter, representing a closed system with 
strict rules and to be an authorized application, the distribution of complementary products is 
centrally organized.  
3. The open and moderated strategy is fusion of the aforementioned platform schemes, where third 
parties get involved in the system development process; however, the distribution of software is 
also centralized.  
4. Lastly, the closed and free approach is applied by platform providers, which are allowing 
developers to build applications on top of their system, without seeking any authorization. 
However, access to, or modifications of, the core system are not permitted.  
In the payment context, a payment provider that offers platform access to third parties has to consider 
platform design aspects to build a secure moat around its core service, and how to integrate third-party 
apps (usage), to avoid future risks, e.g., competing against your own user base – here, third-party 
applications. 
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3.3 Technology Design: Evolutionary & Revolutionary 
Technological solutions based on hardware or software can be either categorized into evolutionary or 
revolutionary products (Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  
Evolutionary products offer a migration path to a new technology, and at the same time, preserve 
backward compatibility to previous systems. These bridging technologies have the benefit of allowing 
access to an existing user base. As an example, Blu-Ray players are backward compatible, capable of 
playing old DVDs, which offers an additional path to a new technology, clearly illustrating an 
evolutionary hardware approach. Lastly, revolutionary products often offer better performance, 
however, representing a riskier approach. First, the technology itself is, in most cases, not compatible 
with the old and hence, not accessible by an existing user base. Second, it is uncertain whether the new 
technology takes off to create a critical user base, to create a viable platform. For instance, Long-
playing Phonographs (LPs) are incompatible with CD players, requiring users to abandon their LP 
libraries. However, LP users were accepting these high switching costs, since CDs were more practical 
and affordable in their daily use (low homing costs). The incompatibility between LPs and CD players 
illustrates a revolutionary hardware approach. To exemplify technology design in the payment setting, 
smartphones equipped with NFC chips are revolutionary, since they offer a superior payment 
experience compared to the payment card. However, NFC smartphones are incompatible with current 
payment terminals (chip & PIN), reducing the accessibility on the merchant side und the utility on the 
payer side. 
 
3.4  Business Design: Envelopment & Schumpeterian Innovation 
Platform providers with the goal of entering into new markets to tap new revenue streams have two 
options: first, outpacing competitors through Schumpeterian innovation (Schumpeter, 1962, p. 83), i.e. 
being (creative) destructive and replacing the old, in most cases accomplished by firms coming from a 
different industry. Second, entering into new markets through platform envelopment, by leveraging 
shared user relationships and products. 
Envelopment. Platform owners can be enveloped when prospective competitors enter into their market 
and offer the same functionality by bundling it with their existing products, and at the same time, have 
a high degree of user overlap. By offering a multi-platform bundle service, a platform attacker can 
conquer new business fields, and by that tapping new revenue streams (Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). As an example of a platform envelopment attack, Netscape 
was once the dominant Internet browser, but it has been enveloped through Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer web browser, since Netscape users were also users of Microsoft’s Windows operating 
system. The target platform can strengthen its position, by bundling the platform with services that 
match with the attacker platform, or opening up to third parties to increase their value proposition 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011). Schumpeterian innovation presents a radical way to enter into a new market 
by “destroying the old” industry players, but this is costly or rarely achieved. 
 
3.5  Framework Coherence 
As we have showcased the abovementioned platform components, we can now draw the linkages, 
illustrating the explanatory power of our framework (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Framework Coherence 
 
To illustrate the envelopment strategy, platform providers that wish to enter the payment market (or 
any other industry with physical proxies) are required to leverage their existing user base, and at the 
same time, equip them with payment functionalities. Second, in order to have access to a new user 
base, these new payment instruments need to be compatible (evolutionary) with the existing payment 
infrastructure (e.g. payment terminals). Lastly, since these payment instruments (e.g. mobile phone) 
are proxies of digital platforms, platform design may differ, in being open or closed (development 
dimension), and in how the distribution of complementary applications is moderated (usage 
dimension). The presented model illustrates how these different platform components are intertwined 
and layered (i.e. platform & technology design), to explain business and technology design strategies 
of MSPs. 
 
4 Research Method 
Our study approach has an explorative nature, by synthesizing and consolidating key concepts and 
literature into a single theoretical framework. In order to provide an answer to the research questions, 
we perform within an European setting a comparative and interpretative case study (Walsham, 1995; 
Yin, 2009). Based on four cases, our digital payment framework serves as a theoretical lens to analyze 
and identify similarities and differences among the cases. The case study method has received ample 
attention in the IS community (Dubé & Paré, 2003), which has the advantage to answer “how” and 
“why” questions, where the researcher has limited or no control over the study object (Yin, 2009). 
Furthermore, by analyzing the idiosyncrasies of different payment incumbents and disrupters, a 
multiple case study promises to yield more general results, in order to grasp complex platform, 
technology and business structures (Yin, 2009). 
Case Selection 
We chose four types of market actors across Europe that exemplifies current digital payment 
providers: banks, MNOs, merchants and payment start-ups. Four European companies emerged from 
the data collection (girogo, Turkcell, Yapital & iZettle) due to large media coverage, and more 
importantly, being market leaders in their sector, having the potential leverage to establish new 
payment platforms on a larger scale.  
Data Collection  
We collected publicly available data from different online sources: press releases, online news and 
industry articles, interviews and speeches at conferences. The search was conducted through online 
industry and technology magazines, search engines and social media channels, while using certain 
keywords in the European payment context: (NFC) mobile payment, NFC payment card, NFC 
MicroSD card, NFC SIM card, NFC phone payment, mobile phone payment, contactless payment, QR 
code payments, and payment card readers (dongles) and limiting the time period from May 2011 
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through the end of March 2013. Online industry and technology magazines were particularly useful, 
since they represent journalism, comprehensively covering recent technological developments in the 
retail and payment area with in-depth background knowledge and analysis. The sample size is 
presented in Table 1.  
 
Data Sources Description 
Interviews - Four interviews with Yapital’s CEO Nils Winkler 
• Two transcribed interviews by derhandel.de and etailment.de 
• Two interviews in video format by empiria group (DE) and paperJam TV (LU) 
- One transcribed interview by mobilemoneyrevolution.co.uk with Turkcell’s Cenk Bayrakdar, Chief New 
Technology Business Officer  
- One interview in video format by empiria group (DE) with Magnus Nilsson, iZettle’s CFO  
Press releases All press releases related to new payment instruments: girogo (3), Turkcell (4), Yapital (4), iZettle (21) 
Conference One of the authors attended the payment conference “The Nordic and Baltic CAC Mobile & NFC Conference 
2013,” where iZettle provided insights during and after the presentation. 
Online articles and 
reports 
girogo (23), Turkcell (5), Yapital (7) and iZettle (9) (cisco.com, computersweden.se, derhandel.de, finextra.com, 
geldkarte.de, mobilepaymentstoday.com, nfctimes.com, nfcworld.com, spiegle.de, telecompaper.com, 
techcrunch.com, thenextweb.com, welt.de, WSJ.com) 
Local radio news Two radio news and radio interview about girogo (DAS HITRADIO and ddp direct) 
Table 1. Data Sources for the Analysis 
Analysis 
The analyses were conducted in three stages: To begin, the first author imported the web data as PDF 
and audio files into Nvivo 10, a qualitative analysis software program that allows a structured way to 
collect and categorize data. Secondly, the first author performed a directed content analysis by coding 
and categorizing the unstructured data, based on the proposed framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). Thirdly, after the categorization, the first author had in-depth 
discussions with the co-author to interpret the data. Conversely, the second author plays the role of the 
devil’s advocate by coming up with alternative interpretations and counter-arguments (Adler & Adler, 
1988). The entire coding process followed an iterative cycle and data analysis was only completed 
when both authors agree on the placement of quotes in accordance with the proposed framework. 
5. Four Digital Payment Platforms 
To demonstrate the usefulness of our digital payment framework, we will analyze four types of digital 
payment platforms, provided by banks, MNOs, merchants and start-ups, each of which seek to sustain 
or overthrow the status quo in the payment area. 
Sparkasse (Incumbent). In April 2012, the German saving bank group (Sparkasse) started the 
initiative to pilot test contactless payment cards, called girogo, in three major cities: Hannover, 
Braunschweig, and Wolfsburg. The pilot project has initially equipped 1.5 million cardholders with 
girogo NFC payment cards, enabling them to perform contactless payments. The existing debit card 
contains a built-in NFC prepaid card, where the NFC payment functionality is currently tied to the 
prepaid payment method. To incentivize the adoption of contactless payments on the merchant side, 
up to 20 Euro, girogo fees are lower (max. 3 Euro Cents) compared to the regular PIN payment 
method. Besides the pilot regions, the Sparkassen group has teamed up with a small number of soccer 
clubs, where member cards are bundled with girogo, allowing fast and convenient payments, fostering 
the brand perception beyond the pilot region. Other major German banks have not made the 
announcement that they will adopt the girogo, but are following the development closely. It is worth 
noting that all German banks are indirectly involved in girogo through the umbrella organization 
Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft that finances the R&D costs, offering the possibility to join the girogo 
bandwagon if and when it starts rolling. 
Turkcell (Disrupter). In cooperation with the Turkish Yapi Kredit Bank and the credit card company 
MasterCard, Turkcell, the largest MNO in Turkey, launched in April 2011 its mobile payment 
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initiative called Turkcell Cüzdan (Wallet). Turkcell’s mobile payment service allows performing 
contactless mobile payment (Turkcell, 2011). So far, Turkcell has been successful in teaming up with 
several Turkish banks, which support Turkcell’s NFC and mobile payment initiative. Turkcell’s 
business model is based on a SIM rental model, charging banks a monthly fee. Besides offering 
mobile payments, Turkcell increases its value proposition by offering non-payment services, e.g. 
loyalty programs, ticketing, rewards or location-based deals (Middleton, 2012).  
To diffuse and foster the NFC landscape further, Turkcell is encouraging other MNOs, and its Turkish 
rivals, to license its mobile payment system. At launch date, the Turkish MNO were benefiting from 
an existing terminal infrastructure (66,000 units) for contactless payments, where banks and terminal 
providers have the ambition to increase up to 2 million units over the next few years (Cisco, 2012). 
However, Turkcell is acknowledging itself that its NFC payment rollout is taking longer than 
expected. To tackle this hurdle and increase the user base for its mobile payment service, Turkcell 
started to offer P2P payment service for ordinary phones, based on SMS. It can be assumed that 
rolling out mobile payments to non-NFC phones could help Turkcell to spur its payment initiative in 
the mid-term view. Firstly, this would allow it to increase its installed user base while using widely 
available technologies (SMS). Secondly, later on, these users are prepared to adopt NFC phones, and 
thus, Turkcell’s contactless payments. 
Yapital (Disrupter). In March 2012, OTTO, the second-largest online retailer after Amazon, created 
buzz in the German media by rolling out its own payment system called Yapital. Through its 
subsidiary Yapital Financial AG, OTTO is planning to offer online, P2P, and in-store payment 
systems, based on NFC, QR codes or physical payment cards, the latter in cooperation with 
MasterCard. Yapital’s mobile payment platform is specifically designed to be compatible with the 
existing terminal infrastructure and being independent, to bypass intermediaries (e.g., MNOs). A 
software update for ordinary payment terminals brings the functionality to display QR codes, which 
can be afterward recognized by smartphone cameras to process Yapital payments at the checkout 
counter. To complement and improve the Yapital payment application further, in February 2013, the 
parent company OTTO acquired for Yapital the mobile commerce company NuBon, which is a 
specialist in mobile loyalty and couponing. Both companies have plans to exchange their technical 
know-how, in order to benefit from synergy effects. NuBon is going to integrate Yapital payment 
functions into their loyalty app, whereas Yapital is interested in integrating NuBon’s mobile document 
and receipt management functionality.  
iZettle (Disrupter). In 2011, the Swedish startup iZettle launched smart card readers, capable of 
transforming iOS and Android devices into mobile payment terminals by plugging a dongle into the 
headphone jack or dock connector. The Scandinavian startup, which has partnered with several 
institutional investors and actors from the payment landscape (e.g., MasterCard, American Express, 
Deutsche Telekom, Nordea), follows the vision to “democratize card payments,” empowering small 
businesses as well as individuals (P2P) to accept card payments. In its second rollout in February 
2013, iZettle launched, for merchants only, a chip and PIN payment card reader with a keypad that 
establishes a connection via Bluetooth to mobile phones. The reason to come up with an additional 
payment device is that iZettle was forced to disable Visa card payments based on chip and signature 
authentication, which did not fulfill Visa Europe’s safety standards. The unique selling point of iZettle 
is, besides being easy to use and having a coolness factor, that the billing is solely transaction based 
(2.75% fee), which does not require lengthy contracts or fixed fees compared to traditional payment 
providers. The iZettle payment scheme is therefore attractive to small merchants who cannot afford 
stationary payment terminals. To offer a higher value proposition, iZettle bundles the payment 
application with a catalogue feature and sales statistic tool, to provide data for sales tracking. 
Furthermore, iZettle allows, through closed APIs, third-party developers to integrate the payment 
service into their own apps. 
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In Table 2 we perform a comparative-case analysis of the aforementioned payment actors. We use the previous intra-case analyses to identify similarities and 
differences among the payment actors, in order to ensure generalizability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Sparkasse (girogo) 
 Bank  
Turkcell 
MNO 
Yapital 
Merchant  
iZettle 
Startup  
 
Direct Interaction 
Multi-Sided Platform 
 
The girogo payment platform is 
inherently a MSP that facilitates direct 
interactions between merchants and 
cardholders. 
Turkcell assumes the role of being a 
facilitator for direct interactions. Rather 
than offering its own payment system, 
Turkcell charges fees or royalties for 
hosting NFC payment and service 
applications. 
Currently, Yapital is going to offer its 
mobile payment systems as a one-sided 
platform, since it is only accepted within 
the OTTO group. Therefore, it cannot be 
classified as a MSP.  
iZettle offers a true MSP, enabling 
through their payment dongles direct 
interactions between merchants and 
individuals, as well as between 
individuals. 
 
Platform Design 
Closed or Open Platform 
To guarantee uniformity, girogo applies 
a closed and moderated system approach 
that asserts control over platform 
development and complementary 
products. Other banks are welcomed to 
join as platform providers. 
 
Turkcell follows, like girogo, the closed 
and moderated platform approach. 
Compared to girogo, Turkcell differs by 
pro-actively inviting third parties, i.e., its 
MNO rivals, to join its mobile payment 
platform.  
 
It is likely that Yapital is going after a 
closed and moderated platform 
approach, to ensure initial system 
consistency. Besides inviting other 
merchants to adopt their payment 
system, Yapital is going to offer closed 
APIs to selected third parties, to diffuse 
its payment platform further. 
 
iZettle applies a closed and moderated 
platform approach. Even so, they offer 
selective access through protected APIs, 
allowing third-party developers to 
implement payment functionalities into 
their app.  
 
 
 
Technology Design 
Evolutionary & 
Revolutionary 
 
The platform owner of girogo pursues an 
evolutionary product strategy, which 
supports the existing payment card 
infrastructure.   
By equipping ordinary phones with NFC 
SIM cards (or enabling SMS payments), 
Turkcell follows an evolutionary product 
strategy. On the merchant side, however, 
contactless payment requires new NFC 
terminals, hence revolutionary.  
Yapital clearly follows with QR code 
payments an evolutionary product 
strategy, to be compatible on the 
customer side (mobile phones) as well as 
on the merchant side (payment 
terminals). 
 
Payment dongles and keypads are, by 
design, evolutionary products that work 
with existing mobile phones and 
payment cards (chip/PIN). 
 
 
Business Design 
Platform Envelopment & 
Schumpeterian Innovation 
Girogo increases its value proposition by 
bundling its NFC payment card with 
non-payment application (ticketing). 
 
Girogo has a secure moat around its 
payment service, since NFC payment 
cards cannot be enveloped, due to 
restricted card access. Once girogo 
enters the mobile phone as a payment 
instrument, it faces the risk of 
envelopment.  
 
Turkcell increases its value proposition 
by bundling mobile payment with 
various non-payment services (loyalty). 
 
Turkcell has the general risk to be 
enveloped, since the mobile OS is a 
shared platform with (upcoming) rivals, 
which are able to circumvent NFC. 
Turkcell itself assumes the role of a 
potential enveloper, by offering a multi-
platform bundle service to its customer 
base. 
Besides bundling its mobile payment 
system with loyalty and promotions, 
Yapital can rely on its parent company 
OTTO to integrate (bundle) Yapital 
payments with other subsidiaries across 
the OTTO group. 
 
Yapital carries the risk of envelopment, 
since it shares the mobile handset with 
potential payment rivals. Contrary, 
Yapital is in the attempt to envelop bank 
customers through direct debits.  
iZettle bundles its mobile payment 
service with a catalogue function and 
sales statistic tool, to increase its value 
proposition. 
 
iZettle has the greatest risk of 
envelopment, because it does not own 
the payment card and the mobile phone, 
which can be accessed by rivals. On the 
other hand, iZettle tries to envelop 
primarily merchant customers through 
the aforementioned bundling offer. 
Table 2. Comparative Case Analysis 
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Discussion 
Direct Interaction. Three of the four cases fulfil the criteria for being multi-sided platforms that 
enable direct commercial interactions between merchants and cardholders. In the case of Yapital, 
however, the current payment platform setting does not classify it as an MSP because this mobile 
payment system functions only in its own company group.  
Platform Design. According to our analysis, all payment actors follow the closed and moderated 
approach (see Figure 3), where third parties have to submit complementary applications in a controlled 
manner (usage dimension). Girogo (Sparkasse), Turkcell and Yapital, rigidly control their proprietary 
payment systems (development dimension), though they are inviting other actors from the same 
industry to adopt their payment systems, in the hope of diffusing their payment ecosystems further. 
The payment start-up iZettle is less hospitable to its rivals, offering rather restricted APIs to third-party 
developers. It can be concluded that the application of the closed and moderated system approach 
guarantees these actors a unified user experience and control over the distribution of complementary 
products. All these measures are helping to fertilize newly launched payment platforms. 
Technology Design. It can be noted that all actors follow an evolutionary product strategy that 
promises a smooth migration path to a new payment technology, which is characterized by 
compatibility, i.e., access to a large and existing user base. Merchants, however, who wish to accept 
NFC payments (e.g., girogo or Turkcell), are required to deploy new NFC payment terminals. The 
incompatibility on the merchant side represents a revolutionary hardware approach. Turkcell follows 
two-track approach. Turkcell realized that the market was not ready for NFC payments. As a result, it 
scaled back technology-wise by offering SMS payments, which works with ordinary phones. 
Turkcell’s backward compatibility is an attempt to increase the user base in a rapid fashion, and lastly 
to recruit them afterwards for contactless payments, as soon they have adopted NFC phones or SIM 
cards.  
Business Design. The studied payment actors seek to follow the strategy of bundling their existing 
payment platforms with various and valuable non-payment applications (e.g., ticketing), to tap new 
revenue sources, where payment service itself serves primarily as a gateway product. In general, 
bundling allows platform owners to introduce new technologies, increasing the value proposition, and 
thus expediting the adoption rate; moreover, it is, in essence, a pre-emptive action to protect their 
market position and to circumvent envelopment by competitors. 
Envelopment. Except girogo (Sparkasse), all other payment actors carry the risk to be enveloped, due 
to the fact that these actors utilize the mobile phone to introduce their new payment instruments, 
which are actually owned and controlled by the end user. The consequences are that these new 
payment instruments share the mobile phone OS (iOS, Android) with other potential payment rivals, 
i.e., they act more as tenants, where the end user is the landlord. All this leads to a major risk of 
envelopment. In addition, the NFC technology itself brings the beneficial ability to block subsequent 
NFC solutions; however, mobile payment applications based on QR codes, which are offered by 
Yapital (merchant), enable circumvention of these NFC solutions. Girogo has the comfortable position 
to avoid envelopment while issuing its NFC payment cards. Nevertheless, as soon as girogo enter the 
mobile payment arena, they are also confronted with the risk of envelopment. The implications are 
that certain payment technologies can prevent as well as empower platform envelopment, where the 
mobile phone as a payment instrument presents a risky approach for payment actors.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
By attempting to better describe contemporary digital payment systems, this paper contributes to the 
payment literature from the multi-sided platform theory angle, to accommodate recent technological 
developments, with an emphasis on new digital payment platforms. So far, research has extensively 
studied payment cards as two-sided platforms (Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). However, 
the current digital payment arena is developing rapidly. Fuelled by NFC cards or mobile payments, 
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new payment actors started to create new payment platforms and instruments, which are able to host 
several services at once. The consequence is that they are transforming these initial two-sided 
platforms into multi-sided digital payment platforms.   
Through our findings, we can hereby answer our research questions, and thereby offer practitioners 
valuable insights: First, Payment instruments are evolving from being initially two-sided (merchant 
and cardholder), to multi-sided digital payment platforms, which is achieved by bundling and 
incorporating third-party services. To capture value from these third parties and to reduce the risk of 
envelopment, four different platform design strategies (Figure 3) can be applied, where the closed and 
moderated is the preferred design approach. Second, evolutionary payment instruments (e.g., SMS or 
QR code) is the preferred technology design approach, that offers as a migration path to a new 
technology, at the same time access to a ready-made user base. Lastly, to tap new revenue streams, 
payment actors deliberately bundle their service with (lucrative and data rich) non-payment 
applications, where payment itself serves rather as a gateway product. Furthermore, a well-thought 
bundling strategy based on mobile payment may also serve as a ramp for platform envelopment, by 
leveraging shared customer relationships.  
From the practitioner’s view, the framework can be utilized to identify or forge different digital 
payment platform design strategies to increase adoption on the payer and payee side. Secondly, 
managers can evaluate alternative design paths and strategies (Figure 4), as digital payment platforms 
evolve and mature over time. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented the digital payment platform design framework, which has been 
tailored from existing literature to explain multi-sided digital payment platforms. To provide an 
answer to our research question, we have performed within the European setting a multiple and 
comparative case study, by using our framework as an analytical tool to identify similarities and 
differences among the cases, in order to create theoretical generalizability. 
This paper pinpoints the following key findings on how payment incumbents and disrupters design 
digital payment platforms, and which design choices they have: (1) Payment instruments are evolving 
from being initially two-sided (merchant and cardholder), to multi-sided digital payment platforms, 
which is achieved by bundling and incorporating third-party services. To capture value and to reduce 
the risk of platform envelopment, four different platform design strategies can be applied, where the 
closed and moderated is the preferred design approach. (2) Evolutionary payment instruments is the 
prevailing technology design strategy, which is compatible with an existing user base and to its 
payment infrastructure, promise low switching costs. Revolutionary payment instruments (NFC 
mobile phones) offer compelling services, but faced with low adoption on the user side and 
incompatibility on the merchant side. (3) Lastly, to tap new revenue streams, the studied payment 
actors bundle their service with non-payment services, where payment acts as a gateway product. 
Combined with an elaborate bundling strategy, it may lead to platform envelopment, in other words, a 
Trojan horse attack. 
Future studies could address our limitations, since we showcased newly launched payment systems, 
where the current setting (e.g., technology design) might change. In addition, we were not able to 
study clashes between payment incumbents and contenders, not to mention potential antitrust issues, 
or the entrance of global players like Google or Apple, which have already disrupted other established 
industries. Finally, studies could also investigate the relationships between payment platforms 
providers and third-party developers.  
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